AI models will be capable enough for terrorist groups to create novel pathogens (near future).
Predictor: Sam Altman · ep#246 "SpaceX Goes Public, Claude's Mythos Release, and the US Data Center Delay | EP #246" · source
Prediction text
AI models will be capable enough for terrorist groups to create novel pathogens (near future). | we're not that far away from a world where there are incredibly capable open source models that are very good at biology. And the need for society to be resilient to terrorist groups using these models to try to create novel pathogens is like that's no longer a theoretical thing or it's not going to be for much longer.
Verbatim quote
we're not that far away from a world where there are incredibly capable open source models that are very good at biology. And the need for society to be resilient to terrorist groups using these models to try to create novel pathogens is like that's no longer a theoretical thing or it's not going to be for much longer.
Predictor: Sam Altman
Calibration plot (stated vs observed)
Evidence about this node from Sam Altman is multiplied by κ in /api/intake. Lower κ = less weight; floors at 0.10 (effectively silenced) and caps at 1.00 (full weight).
Reference class
This node isn't linked to a reference class. The Bayesian update applies without outside-view blending.
Probability over time
Milestone chain
- 2025-04-30hitOpenAI April 2025 risk assessment flags 'high' biorisk capabilityHow: OpenAI publishes formal risk assessment concluding next models meet 'high' bio-risk threshold under their Preparedness FrameworkSource: ComputerUser — OpenAI says its next AI might be powerful enough to aid bioweaponsconf 95%Notes: HIT — OpenAI formally flagged 'high risks' substantially increasing likelihood of bioterrorist attacks. Validates Altman's 'no longer theoretical' framing.
- 2025-02-15hitAnthropic Claude 3.7 Sonnet shows concerning bioweapon assistanceHow: Anthropic publishes evaluation showing Claude 3.7 Sonnet 'demonstrates concerning improvements' in supporting biological weapons developmentSource: Anthropic — Biorisk red team reportconf 95%Notes: HIT — Anthropic's own published assessment confirms Altman's claim direction.
- 2025-08-15hitAI labs deploy CBRN-content training data filtrationHow: Anthropic / OpenAI publicly disclose deploying classifier-based dataset filtration to scrub CBRN content from trainingSource: Anthropic alignment team blog (Aug 2025)conf 95%Notes: HIT — Industry response to validated risk; ~5% inference compute spent on bioweapons classifiers per Amodei.
- 2025-06-01 → 2026-12-31pendingOpen-source model with strong biology capability releasedHow: Major open-weights model (Llama, Mistral, Qwen, DeepSeek class) released with biology benchmark performance approaching frontier closed modelsSource: Hugging Face leaderboards; major model release announcementsconf 85%Notes: Cascade — Open-source models present unique unfilterable risk per CSIS analysis.
- 2025-06-01 → 2027-06-30pendingFederal/international biosecurity AI policy proposalHow: US (BIS, OSTP) or G7 announces formal AI-bio export control or know-your-customer rules for cloud compute accessSource: US BIS rules; G7/G20 communiquesconf 65%Notes: Cascade — Policy follows risk validation; CSIS, Belfer, CNAS all calling for action.
- 2025-12-01 → 2027-12-31pendingFirst documented attempted misuse of AI for bio R&DHow: Public incident report (FBI, biosecurity org) documents an attempted attack or near-miss where AI was used to assist novel pathogen designSource: FBI WMD Directorate; CDC; NTI; Council on Strategic Risksconf 40%Notes: Cascade — The endpoint Altman warns about. Detection challenge is significant.
What if this resolves?
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Evidence chain
Network propagation neighbors
Top incoming (parents)
Edges that influence THIS node's belief
| Kind | Node | Their prob | P(c|s=T) | P(c|s=F) | Δ implied |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| prereq | 234_012 Anthropic revenue will cross OpenAI revenue in middle of 202 — Peter Diamandis | 67.1% | 0.600 | 0.050 | -0.091 |
| prereq | SEM_042 2025 will be the definitive year that agentic systems finall — Kevin Weil | 73.8% | 0.600 | 0.050 | -0.055 |
| prereq | SEM_012 Nvidia quadrupled chip production output while only doubling — Jensen Huang | 75.0% | 0.600 | 0.050 | -0.048 |
| killer | TK03 AI Regulatory Moratorium (EU/US Capability Freeze) | 10.0% | 0.050 | 0.600 | +0.039 |
| prereq | SEM_008 Training runs costing $10 billion for a single model will co — Dario Amodei | 76.9% | 0.600 | 0.050 | -0.038 |
Top outgoing (children)
Predictions THIS node influences
| Kind | Node | Their prob | P(c|s=T) | P(c|s=F) | Δ implied |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| prereq | 231_013 Math is cooked (will be solved), physics cooked, biology cha — Alex Wissner-Gross | 35.4% | 0.620 | 0.050 | -0.020 |
| prereq | 232_055 We're exiting the industrial age permanently as recursive se — Peter Diamandis | 35.5% | 0.700 | 0.050 | +0.019 |
| prereq | CMQ_002 By 2028, AI systems will reach 'independent researcher' leve — Sam Altman | 31.4% | 0.550 | 0.050 | -0.015 |
| prereq | 241_043 ASI will arrive within 2 years to 5 years to this next decad — Peter Diamandis | 35.9% | 0.650 | 0.050 | -0.010 |
| prereq | 235_030 Ray Kurzweil predicts Longevity Escape Velocity (LEV) by 203 — Ray Kurzweil | 39.2% | 0.750 | 0.050 | +0.006 |
Ticker exposure
Beneficiaries (23)
Adverse (6)
Prerequisites (8)
| Type | Pred | Title | Domain | Lag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| prereq | SEM_008 | Training runs costing $10 billion for a single model will commence sometime in 2025. | AI | — |
| prereq | 238_009 | Recursive self-improvement is already happening now (no longer three years out) | AI | — |
| prereq | 234_012 | Anthropic revenue will cross OpenAI revenue in middle of 2026 | Markets/Stocks | — |
| prereq | SEM_012 | Nvidia quadrupled chip production output while only doubling human headcount — achieved by deploying AI coding tools (Cursor, Claude Code) across engineering. | AI/Manufacturing | — |
| prereq | SEM_042 | 2025 will be the definitive year that agentic systems finally hit the mainstream. | AI/Agents | — |
| killer | TK14 | Superbubble Pop (S&P 500 -40%, Moonshot Capital Evaporates) | — | — |
| killer | TK01 | AGI Capability Plateau (2026-27 Training Stall) | — | — |
| killer | TK03 | AI Regulatory Moratorium (EU/US Capability Freeze) | — | — |
Dependents (5)
| Type | Pred | Title | Domain | Lag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| prereq | 235_030 | Ray Kurzweil predicts Longevity Escape Velocity (LEV) by 2033. | Biotech/Longevity | — |
| prereq | 232_055 | We're exiting the industrial age permanently as recursive self-improvement unfolds. | AI | — |
| prereq | 241_043 | ASI will arrive within 2 years to 5 years to this next decade | AI | — |
| prereq | 231_013 | Math is cooked (will be solved), physics cooked, biology char broiled. | AI | — |
| prereq | CMQ_002 | By 2028, AI systems will reach 'independent researcher' level — driving autonomous scientific discoveries without human intervention. | AI | — |
Linked documents (5)
| Sim | Source | Title | Market prob | Polarity | Reviewed | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.689 | manifold | When will we see terrorism against AI? | — | mentions | pending | 2026-04-27 |
| 0.625 | arxiv | An Infectious Disease Spread Simulation Based on Large Language Model Decision Making | — | mentions | pending | 2026-06-04 |
| 0.611 | manifold | Will a Hantavirus Vaccine be created in 2026? [Polymarket] | 9% | mentions | pending | 2026-05-08 |
| 0.578 | manifold | Will the hantavirus pandemic market on manifold be used in governments to initiate drastic action against hantavirus? | 3% | mentions | pending | 2026-05-15 |
| 0.540 | polymarket | Hantavirus lab leak confirmed by June 30? | 1% | mentions | pending | 2026-05-07 |
Raw metadata
{
"nia": false,
"url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cFI-SqnvQK8",
"mode": "CITED_PREDICTION",
"role": "Cited-Executive",
"context": "we're not that far away from a world where there are incredibly capable open source models that are very good at biology... terrorist groups using these models to try to create novel pathogens",
"to_year": 2027,
"cited_by": "Peter Diamandis",
"verbatim": "we're not that far away from a world where there are incredibly capable open source models that are very good at biology. And the need for society to be resilient to terrorist groups using these models to try to create novel pathogens is like that's no longer a theoretical thing or it's not going to be for much longer.",
"conv_cues": "not that far away; no longer theoretical",
"direction": "HAPPEN",
"from_year": 2026,
"timeframe": "Near-term",
"conv_level": "HIGH",
"milestones": [
{
"kind": "llm_pre_event",
"label": "OpenAI April 2025 risk assessment flags 'high' biorisk capability",
"notes": "HIT — OpenAI formally flagged 'high risks' substantially increasing likelihood of bioterrorist attacks. Validates Altman's 'no longer theoretical' framing.",
"source": "ComputerUser — OpenAI says its next AI might be powerful enough to aid bioweapons",
"status": "hit",
"weight": 0.4,
"ordinal": -10,
"source_id": null,
"confidence": 0.95,
"source_url": "https://computeruser.com/openai-says-its-next-ai-might-be-powerful-enough-to-aid-bioweapons",
"expected_date": "2025-04-30",
"observed_date": "2025-04-30",
"research_origin": "deep_research",
"measurement_criterion": "OpenAI publishes formal risk assessment concluding next models meet 'high' bio-risk threshold under their Preparedness Framework"
},
{
"kind": "llm_pre_event",
"label": "Anthropic Claude 3.7 Sonnet shows concerning bioweapon assistance",
"notes": "HIT — Anthropic's own published assessment confirms Altman's claim direction.",
"source": "Anthropic — Biorisk red team report",
"status": "hit",
"weight": 0.4,
"ordinal": -9,
"source_id": null,
"confidence": 0.95,
"source_url": "https://red.anthropic.com/2025/biorisk/",
"expected_date": "2025-07-17",
"observed_date": "2025-02-15",
"research_origin": "deep_research",
"expected_date_range": {
"to": "2025-12-31",
"from": "2025-02-01"
},
"measurement_criterion": "Anthropic publishes evaluation showing Claude 3.7 Sonnet 'demonstrates concerning improvements' in supporting biological weapons development"
},
{
"kind": "llm_pre_event",
"label": "AI labs deploy CBRN-content training data filtration",
"notes": "HIT — Industry response to validated risk; ~5% inference compute spent on bioweapons classifiers per Amodei.",
"source": "Anthropic alignment team blog (Aug 2025)",
"status": "hit",
"weight": 0.4,
"ordinal": -8,
"source_id": null,
"confidence": 0.95,
"source_url": "https://red.anthropic.com/2025/biorisk/",
"expected_date": "2025-12-15",
"observed_date": "2025-08-15",
"research_origin": "deep_research",
"expected_date_range": {
"to": "2026-06-30",
"from": "2025-06-01"
},
"measurement_criterion": "Anthropic / OpenAI publicly disclose deploying classifier-based dataset filtration to scrub CBRN content from training"
},
{
"kind": "llm_post_event",
"label": "Open-source model with strong biology capability released",
"notes": "Cascade — Open-source models present unique unfilterable risk per CSIS analysis.",
"source": "Hugging Face leaderboards; major model release announcements",
"status": "pending",
"weight": 0.4,
"ordinal": -7,
"source_id": null,
"confidence": 0.85,
"expected_date": "2026-03-17",
"research_origin": "training",
... (truncated)